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INTRODUCTION 
The appeal before this court is extremely narrow. The facts relevant to the appeal 
are equally narrow. The district court treated the subject in that manner and it has been 
so treated by Otter Creek in its opening brief. New Escalante has not followed suit. 
The district court made definitive legal rulings regarding New Escalante's 
alternative claims to waters which are tributary to the Sevier River. New Escalante first 
advanced a diligence claim based on alleged diversion and use which preceded Utah's 
appropriation statute of 1903. Its second claim was based on alleged adverse use during 
the seven years immediately following entry of the Cox Decree on November 30, 1936. 
The district court ruled that New Escalante's diligence claim failed as a matter of 
law and entered summary judgment against it. It declined to grant summary judgment in 
favor of either party on the adverse use claim, but ruled that a water right could be 
acquired by adverse use initiated before but not completed until after such use was 
outlawed in 1939. 
Otter Creek sought and was granted leave of this court to appeal the district court's 
ruling on the adverse use claim. New Escalante joined in that request, but chose not to 
seek leave to cross appeal the summary judgment granted against it on its diligence 
claim. It now emphasizes that it has reserved this claim for future appeal, but offers no 
justification for this inefficient use of judicial resources. 
The anomaly of New Escalante's approach is underscored by the content of its 
statement of the case and its statement of facts. Both principally address its diligence 
claim, and both contain its version of disputed facts, mislabeling these as 
i 
"uncontroverted" and disregarding both the contrary evidence presented by Otter Creek 
and the conclusions drawn by the district court in its written decisions. New Escalante 
erroneously represents that "if the trial court is correct on the issue of adverse possession 
[use], the uncontroverted evidence will result in judgment in [its] favor. . . ." (Resp. 
Brief at vii-viii). 
Otter Creek is constrained to respond. New Escalante paints itself as a victim, and 
takes undue license with the facts and the posture of the case. Even if the trial court were 
affirmed, there are serious evidentiary obstacles facing New Escalante. This court is 
owed a more balanced and accurate statement of facts and statement of the case than has 
been presented. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND SUPPORTING FACTS 
a. The Roots of the Litigation 
The roots of this case appear in a letter of 1991 from the Regional State Engineer 
to New Escalante. The letter advises that New Escalante's unlawful diversion of water 
tributary to the Sevier River has been brought to the attention of the State Engineer. It 
directs that a diversion ditch be backfilled and the surface revegetated. (TR 41, 
Addendum 1, Otter Creek's Opening Brief.) 
New Escalante disregarded the directive, but the following spring (May 1992) it 
filed with the State Engineer a diligence claim for 33 cubic feet per second in the Iron 
Springs Draw on the Griffin Top. (TR 27-33). This is the first known official written 
assertion by New Escalante to the water in question. The State Engineer viewed New 
Escalante's diligence claim as too late filed and contrary to the general adjudication in the 
ii 
Escalante drainage. (TR 39). He also noted that while New Escalante claimed a priority 
of 1875, it sought to appropriate high water runoff for storage in reservoirs that were built 
in 1941 (North Creek) and 1951 (Wide Hollow). (Id,) 
Nothing further appears to have happened until the summer of 1997 when without 
warning or authorization and in direct defiance of the State Engineer, New Escalante 
went on the Griffin Top with major earth moving equipment and greatly enlarged and 
extended the small ditch which had previously existed. (TR 262-283). An inquiry with 
the Forest Service verified the lack of authorization: 
We have not issued New Escalante Irrigation Company a permit 
authorizing them to conduct this type of work. Some documents of a 
proposed ditch in connection with the North Creek Dam and Reservoir 
exist. We do have an existing special use permit for the North Creek Dam 
and Reservoir [lower in the Escalante drainage]; however, the Dixie 
National Forest has not received an application for a special use permit for 
this proposed ditch. (TR 156). 
Otter Creek hired Hydrologist Gerald Robinson to review what New Escalante had 
done. Robinson made an on-site inspection and assembled and reviewed other evidence. 
Excerpts from his unrebutted affidavit and report filed herein (TR 262-283) state: 
My study of the three sets of aerial photographs obtained in the flights of 
I960, 1991, and 1999, all show that some form of small "ditch" diversion 
has been in existence on the Griffin Top for at least back to 1960. fl[ 3, TR 
270). 
[F]rom comparison of the 1960 aerial photos and the 1991 aerial photos, we 
can say with fair certainty that, within this time period, the small "ditch" 
was enlarged only slightly in cross section. . . .(Id) 
Then sometime in 1997, the Defendant Irrigation Co. greatly enlarged the 
"ditch," this time by excavation of a huge conveyance channel, best 
iii 
described as a "canal". . . [T]he 1999 aerial photo (post construction of the 
canal) appears to show that the New Escalante Co. has extended the "canal" 
channel downstream some several hundred feet. This was done, 
apparently, because deepening of the "canal" to better breach the drainage 
divide required a longer channel length to daylight to existing ground than 
previously. (Id, 270-271.) 
The hydrologist provided data for the depth of the excavation and the height of the berm 
on the lower side. 
At the "canal" cross section #2 where the channel is the deepest. . . the 
"canal" has the following approximate cross section (information 
estimated): a) 8-ft. bottom width; b) approximate 8 to 10-ft. depth below 
the natural ground surface (with all excavated material being built into a 
dike on the lower side. . . with height of 10 to 15-feet to top of berm 
above underlying existing ground surface. . . .) fl[ 11, TR 276). 
The hydrologist computed the carrying capacity of the canal. In the upper end at 
the first cross section, he arrived at a capacity of 1,328 cubic feet per second. (Id.). 
Where the channel was the deepest and the berm the highest, the capacity reaches 3,700 
cubic feet per second. (Id., 276-277). At the very lower end, the channel would carry 
156 cubic feet per second within its banks flf 12, TR 277), but at this point the water is 
over the divide so that it could spill over the banks and thus carry a considerably larger 
quantity. (Id.). The hydrologist included this telling explanation: 
I made the calculations for the capacity of the canal at the three cross 
section points in order to show that the capacity of the entire drainage of the 
constructed "canal" is astronomically larger than what a channel should be 
to convey the mere 33.0 cubic feet per second claimed by Diligence Claim 
by the Defendants. In fact, calculations show that a mere small "ditch" 
with a bottom width of 2 feet, a depth of 1.3 f e e t , . . . is practically all that 
is required to convey the 33 cfs. (^ f 13, TR 278). 
The hydrologist identified the impact from the expansion that had occurred: 
iv 
Thus, even though the original diversion "ditch" of 1960 did not intercept 
all of the drainage from the Iron Spring "seep" drainage arm, and only as 
much of the Iron Spring Draw drainage as its limited capacity could hold, 
the new diversion "canal" purposely has been excavated of such size and 
of such length extension to intercept qU of the water from both drainages, 
(U 8, TR 274, emphasis by italics added). 
Finally the hydrologist gave an opinion about historical use and his basis therefor: 
[T]he immediate area below where the diversion "ditch of tlle past once 
flowed, and certainly below where the diversion "canal" of the present has 
flowed for one Spring runoff, there is not a vestige of a channel formed 
from concentrated flow having been issued over a long period of time, i i 
merely is a low, wide "swale" not having conveyed concentrated flows over 
the time "since 1875" as stated in New Escalante's Diligence Claim. 
[T]he lack of an erosion channel below the "canal" end presently and the 
"ditch" end in years past shows that very little water has ever gone down 
North Creek as diversion from the Sevier River Basin. (% 16, TR 279, 
emphasis by italics added). 
b. Failure to Participate in Two General Adjudications 
Ott i r Ci eek zi al fill :» d th i \ ' it! in I si lit : i I h lh < 2. 2001 It soi igl it judgi i lei it 
declaring its ownership of the water in question, an order of restoration and revegetation, 
a permanent restraining order and an award of damages for losses and abstractions of its 
\ atei ( I R 1 81) 1" le w Escalante i noved t :i« clisi i liss the ac tion or , it i tl le alternau 
stay while it sought to advance its late-filed diligence claim in the general adjudication of 
the Colorado River Drainage. This adjudication includes the Escalante River Basin and 
is (H.iii'iiliiig hcli it Ih ' ili'.liniin I "i mill in \\ .IUII < mink l 'i\ ill Ho I I I I! IK K-I-Kd) hi lln. 
context of this proceeding, New Escalante acknowledged that it had not filed a claim and 
was not a participant in the general adjudication of the waters of the Sevier River which 
culminated with issuance of me v ,L\ »A\,KC M. IVM further acknowledged 
that while if w;r :: -wticipar-4 ' *' : • *' l-\< •'.:•!. 
-
it did not file a water user's claim for this water in that proceeding, nor did it assert an 
objection to the Proposed Determination of Water Rights in the Escalante drainage filed 
in 1969. (TR98). New Escalante's effort to derail this lawsuit failed. On December 20, 
2002, the district court, relying on the stipulated fact that the water in question originates 
within the Sevier River Drainage, concluded that this dispute should be determined in the 
existing action rather than the general adjudication of the Colorado River. (TR 175-176). 
Thereafter, New Escalante answered and counterclaimed advancing the alternative 
theories previously noted. (TR 295-305). 
c. Two Rounds of Summary Judgment Motions 
There have been two rounds of summary judgment motions and hearings 
regarding New Escalante's alternative theories. Each resulted in a memorandum 
decision. The first decision set the stage for the second round and contains the judge's 
conclusion with respect to the competing evidence. It is contrary to the position 
advanced by New Escalante in its statement of the case and its statement of facts. New 
Escalante supported its claimed use beginning in 1875 by five affidavits from persons 
who were born between 1904 and 1921. (TR 360-35, 376-383). In analyzing whether 
New Escalante had established its pre-1903 use with reasonable certainty, the court 
stated: 
The evidence produced by the affiants in this case could be 
interpreted to conclude that before 1903 the waters of Iron Spring were 
diverted into a ditch by New Escalante and put to beneficial use. It goes 
without saying that such an interpretation is disputed by plaintiffs. 
It is not necessary to resolve that dispute at the present time. In fact, 
it is possible that no decision on this theory will ever be required depending 
vi 
on the outcome of the notice issue in regards to the Cox Decree. Therefore, 
I decline to grant summary judgment on this theory until the notice issue is 
resolved. 
The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied. The denial 
is without prejudice. I am hopeful that the notice issue can be developed 
and focused through additional affidavits and another summary judgment 
motion. The resolut^v- ^f that issue may substantially resolve the entire 
case. 
The defendant's motion is also denied without prejudice. Defendant 
should feel free to move for summary judgment in the future if conditions 
warrant. 
(TR466-468, emphasis added, i-irst Memo. : : »' -: • ' •• 
Appendix 1 to New Escalante's Resp. Brief.) 
Otter Creek accepted the suggestion of the district court and conducted an 
exhai istiv e i e\ ie\ > > : f tl: le some 10,000 page recor .i/< w^  img. . . n cstview 
Irrig., Case No. 843, Fifth Judicial District of Utah, Millard County, which comment -J 
on April 28, 1919 and was converted to a general adjudication on August 28, 1920. (I R, 
^mcjuueu ...... issuance of the general adjudication decree on November 
30, 1936. (TR 746-750) A rmed w it! 11 1 ,.« : fiiidinos.,...- * / ..h : is < • if 
Otter Creek renewed its motion for summary judgment based upon New Escalante's 
failure to file a water user's claint in the general adjudication aciiun .\^\\ L^ealante 
countered with its ow n motion for si urn nar> ji idgment on this issi le as w ell as seeking 
summary judgment on its adverse use claim. Otter Creek responded by seeking summary 
judgment in its favor on the adverse use claim As a result of the ol [setting motions, each 
< n 
party became both a movant and a non-movant with respect to both the diligence claim 
and the adverse use claim. 
d. The Differing Burdens on the Movant and the Non-movant 
When Otter Creek first renewed its summary judgment motion, it was the only 
motion before the court. In order to test its legal theory that New Escalante's diligence 
claim was barred by the Cox Decree, Otter Creek as the movant had to accept the non-
movant's version of the facts.1 In this limited context, Otter Creek stated: "For purposes 
of summary judgment, the following are undisputed: . . . "Defendant used and 
maintained the diversion ditch since about 1875 and particularly during the years 
immediately preceding the filing of the Richlands case and during the 17 years while it 
was pending." (TR 594; further see TR 886-892 for analysis of disputed and undisputed 
facts). New Escalante, in its role as movant, now employs this statement to support an 
allegation that its evidence is "uncontroverted." (Resp. Brief, p. vii). Twisting the 
purpose of the statement is indefensible and appears designed to camouflage and 
circumvent the deficiency in its own evidence. Without foundation, New Escalante goes 
on to state, "Otter Creek conceded to the trial court that New Escalante had long prior to 
1
 In testing the movant's legal theory, the record and facts must be viewed in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Hipwell v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 
P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). In applying this standard, the Court must construe not only 
facts but all reasonable inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Lopez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 932 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah 1997). The moving party 
must carry the burden under Rule 56(e). Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 
(Utah 1997). The non-moving party, in order to defeat summary judgment, need only 
make a "showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to . . . [the 
moving party's] case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 
Celetix Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 
viii 
1939 specifically between 1936 and 1939, and for extended periods of more than seven 
\cai:>. .iij . . uous uninterrupted lupine, open, notorious an,; auxerse ixncncui 
use of the water from the Iron Springs area." (Resp. Brief p 2). New Escalante thus 
inappropriately advances its version of disputed facts to support its summary judgment 
:•••'- .1. .. - itipicLci) disregards .... ,: it bears as the movant. 
e. Structuring the I ,epal Issues for fliii I IIIIVI nir < ourt 
In seeking summary judgment on each of New Escalante's claims, Otter Creek 
..; .. the position that even ifNew Escalante's version of disputed facts were taken as 
true, it made no difference. Its position ma) be stated as follows: 
1. Assuming, arguendo, that New Escalante began using water from the 
Sevier Drainage I. ,n ,; .v.iKiiu^w , u ^ i use through issuance of the general 
adjudic : • "'• • »• proceedh lgs and to ac:h ai ice 
its claim resulted in a loss of its water right as a matter of law. 
2. Assuming, arguendo, that one day after entry of the general adjudication 
owners and such use continued for seven years, the statutory changes of 1939 preclude it 
from obtaining a vested water right as a matter of law. 
both the decree and the statute that "forever bars" New Escalante from asserting any 
claim to the water in question. (Second Memo. Dec, p. 4-7, TR 907-909). That ruling 
Ml inn! in Il in i | i |n ill i , MmvM I h e i v l i n m I l i r ill .Inn I i niiiiil t i i s a g u n <1 \\ mill I I ' l ln l n ; c k 
on the second point, and held that the statutory changes of 1939 did not preclude a right 
i: :: 
vesting thereafter providing the adverse use commenced prior to such statutory changes. 
{Id., p. 13, TR 916). That ruling is the sole subject of this appeal. 
f. How the Supreme Court Decision Will Impact this Litigation 
If this court holds that adverse use after 1939 is treated the same as if the water 
were "allowed to run to waste," as the statute mandates, then it is not possible for New 
Escalante to establish seven years of adverse use and the only issue remaining for trial is 
Otter Creek's claim for damages. If, on the other hand, the court concludes that adverse 
use after 1939 remained viable for up to seven years, then there will be a trial on New 
Escalante's adverse use claim. It will be obliged to prove not only its seven years of 
claimed use between 1936 and 1943 but the extent thereofwithin the same timeframe. It 
could not thereafter enlarge its right. It would gain nothing from its clandestine, brazen 
and rogue-like effort in 1997 by which it greatly enlarged its diversion and intercepted all 
the waters from two drainages. The district court zeroed in on New Escalante's skimpy 
evidence and made a pointed and clear ruling regarding the relevant time frame, the 
irrelevance of four of New Escalante's five supporting affidavits, and the sole evidence 
by which New Escalante survived Otter Creek's summary judgment motion: 
Defendant submitted the following affidavits to establish the . . . 
[adverse use] elements: (1) Affidavit of Melvin Alvey; (2) Affidavit of 
Neal Liston; (3) Affidavit of Usher L. Spencer; (4) Affidavit of Gail C. 
Bailey; and (5) Affidavit of Doyle S. Cottam. 
Plaintiffs countered with a Motion to Strike those affidavits based on 
lack of foundation and lack of competency. Specific challenges to the 
affidavits are as follows: 
x 
1. that the affiants born after 1900 testified about facts that 
occurred in 1875; 
2. • that the evidence supplied rclcrs to 1:1 I • tii i le pc i h : :I ft < )! :i I 1910 
to 1930, which is not relevant: and 
3. that the statements concerning the time period from 1930 to 
1940 are generalizations, 
rhe elements of adverse possession must have been sati^iiud v 
Defendant during the period of 1936 to 1943. Statements concerning 
adverse use at any other time prior to 1936 or after 1943 are immaterial 
The Affidavit of Melvin Alvey contains one statement in paragraph 
number 7 concerning the relevant time period. It reads: "Since the early 
1930's, maintenance on the Ditch has been performed with mechanized 
equipment. The Irrigation Company would hire a backhoe or caterpillar 
out ofPanguitch or Salina to rebuild the ditch, whenever it became 
necessary. " I think this statement contains specific information based on 
personal knowledge of the affiant, who was an active participant in the 
affairs of the New Escalante Irrigation Company. This statement is 
permitted to stand, 
(TR 916-918, emphasis added. Second Memo. Dec. ai 1 J- J :>. Photocopy attached as 
Addendum 4 to Otter Creek's Brief on Appeal and Appendix 2 to New Escalante's Resp. 
Brief.) 
] . escalante remains in *.uu, ; ui.vu oi. two sentences \\hicli broad-brush the 
1930's and arguably * r*: • • f . , • » . • • of R i Ue 
56(e). Nevertheless, Otter Creek has accepted the ruling to facilitate bringing to this 
eouil a straightforward legal issue of whether use oi water without nglu alter the 
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2
 The rule is exacting: "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify of the matters stated therein." 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Statutes Likely to be Controlling in this Appeal are the Forfeiture 
Provision and the Appropriation Provision as Amended in 1939. 
The district court below either overlooked or completely ignored the amendment 
to the forfeiture provision. This amendment is crucial in effectively closing the door to 
adverse use effective March 20, 1939. The trial court makes the mistake of looking only 
to the appropriation provision. New Escalante makes the same mistake in its response 
brief. It does not include the forfeiture statute as a "determinative legal provision," nor 
does it cite or discuss it in its legal argument. It makes an oblique reference to it in 
footnote 3 at page 4 of its brief, but its factual representation as well as the legal 
conclusion drawn in that footnote are flawed as will be demonstrated herein. 
For convenience in reference, the forfeiture provision and the appropriation 
provision are set forth in relevant part as they appear in the 1939 Session Laws. 
1939 - SESSION LAWS (Passed March 7, 1939. In effect March 20, 1939.) 
100-1-4. Reversion to Public by Abandonment or Failure to Use Within 5 
Years - Extending Time. 
When an appropriator or his successor in interest shall abandon or cease to 
use water for a period of five years the right shall cease, and thereupon such water 
shall revert to the public, and may be again appropriated as provided in this title, 
unless before the expiration of such five-year period the appropriator or his 
successor in interest shall have filed with the state engineer a verified application 
for an extension of time, not to exceed five years, within which to resume the use 
of such water and unless pursuant to such application the time within which such 
nonuse may continue is extended by the state engineer as hereinafter provided. 
The provisions of this section are applicable whether such unused or abandoned 
water is permitted to run to waste or is used by others without right. . . . 
[Emphasis added io the language adopted in 1939.] 
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100-3-1. Appropriation - Manner of Acquiring Water Rights. 
Rights to the use of the ui appropriated public waters ii 1 this state may be 
acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of water may be made 
and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no notice of intent to appropriate shall 
be recognized except application for such appropriation first be made to the state 
engineer in the manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise , No right to 
the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by 
adverse use or adverse possession. [Emphasis added to the language adopts 
1939.] 
rhe Statutory Amendments of 1939 Put an End to the Acquisition 
of Any Right Based on Adverse Use. 
each is easily followed and not readily susceptible of being misunderstood. It is laid out 
in detail in Otter Creek's opening brief with appropriate citations. In summary terms, and 
i. • ith DI it r epea t ing an . : . a i io i^ . i: ; ;.,.-.vs-
" I he 1888 Compiled Law * of the lernu^ \ ' j lf //: - • >"•»' ;ed acquisition 
water right based upon seven years of use. Case law treated this as recognizing the 
concept of adverse use. The period ,,„ .orieiture based upon nonuse was also seven 
years I he adverse - - *-- . • .:-«v\ . - ,v"
 (M: 
statehood and never again appears. The seven-year forfeiture provision was retained 
1903, the legislature adopted an appropriation statute that provided thai the onl> method 
V" -v [ • *naU\r" ; • :>. s .: - u . . t.*n! , K\ w 
Engineer. 
In 1919 the legislature amenck u die forfeiture statute by reducing the period of 
r i o n i i M in i" , I in II I mi in in |" iii I  in l u i 11 in in I n f h v V M P \ d r l n i l r s i i l i s n | i i e i i ( h . i i n s i <r I n H i l i c l l i n r 
adverse use remained viable after the appropriation statute of 1903 and, more pointedly, 
even if viable, could it survive for the seven required years when after five years of 
nonuse by the appropriator the water right reverted to the public. 
The debate found its way to the Supreme Court in two 1937 cases. The lead case, 
Hammond v. Johnson, 66 P.2d 894 (Utah 1937), upheld adverse use by concluding that 
the 1903 appropriation statute applied only to "unappropriated" water and that 
previously "appropriated" water did not lose its character when it was being used 
adversely. In Hammond's view, once water had passed into private hands the state had 
no further interest in whose private hands it was being used. Use by the adverser was 
treated the same as use by the appropriator. In this manner, Hammond avoided the five-
year forfeiture and vindicated the adverse use doctrine. Strong petitions for rehearing 
narrowed the decision and reduced the favorable vote from unanimous to three-two, but 
Hammond survived. 
Though Hammondwas not decided until 1937 (petition for hearing denied in 
1938), the claimed adverse use occurred between February 1925 and October 1934. (66 
P.2d at 901). Hammond, therefore, did not consider the 1935 amendment to the forfeiture 
statute or shed any light beyond the time frame in question. The amendments adopted by 
the legislature in 1939 were in direct response to Hammond and are easily understood and 
applied. The appropriation provision (§ 100-3-1) was amended to include "No right to 
the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use 
or adverse possession. " The forfeiture provision (§ 100-1-4) retained the five-year 
nonuse reversion to the public and the 1935 requirement to file for an extension to avoid 
loss of the right. The 1939 amendment then added, "The provisions of this section are 
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applicable whether such unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to waste or is 
used by others without right. . . . " The combined impact of these statutory changes is 
clear. The legislature drew a line in the sand: (1) No further right could be acquired by 
adverse use; (2) after five years of nonuse by the appropriator the right reverted to the 
public unless an extension had been filed for and granted; and (3) use "without right" was 
treated the same as permitting the water to run to waste. It was this third imperative that 
slammed the door shut and made it legally and factually impossible to accumulate the 
seven years required to establish the essential elements of adverse use. 
Applying the amended statutes to the facts of this case leads to the inevitable 
conclusion that New Escalante could not have perfected a water right based upon adverse 
use commencing, as it claims, on December 1, 1936. Some 28 months later, March 1939, 
Utah permanently rejected adverse use as a method for acquiring a water right. 
(§100-3-1). If that were not enough to end the inquiry, then it necessarily ended on 
December 1, 1941. At that point, there would have been five years of nonuse by the 
appropriator and an application to extend had not been filed nor approved. (§ 100-1-4). 
New Escalante would have been powerless to avoid reversion to the public since its 
continuing use "without right" counted for nothing under the statute. New Escalante 
would have been 56 months short of a vested water right when the 1939 amendments 
became effective, and 24 months short when the water reverted to the public. 
New Escalante points out that the "outcome" of Hammond was "supported" in the 
subsequent decision of Wellsville East FieldIrr. Co. v. Lindsey, 137 P.2d 634 (Utah 
1943). This narrow characterization is correct, but the support has a fixed dimension and 
4 
terminus. Though decided after the statutory changes of 1939, Wellsville concerned 
adverse use that had commenced in 1922. (137 P.2d at 637). The subject water right was 
vested long before 1939. There was no suggestion in Wellsville that use after 1939 would 
qualify. Rather the focus was whether to overturn Hammond or let it stand as the 
governing law before the statutory changes. The Wellsville court determined to let 
Hammond stand, but the nature of the "support" was limited. Wellsville did not embrace 
the reasoning of Hammond but noted that "because of confusion in the law" (that the 
court had helped create), some individuals may have relied to their detriment. Based 
upon this scenario, Wellsville reasoned: "We think that. . . [Hammond] attains a 
desirable result and conclude that title could between 1903 and 1939 be acquired by 
adverse possession." 137 P.2d at 640, emphasis added. 
A mistake made by the trial court below is that it relied on Wellsville's acceptance 
of the "outcome" of Hammond under the law before the statutory changes, but 
disregarded the change to the forfeiture provision as well as what Wellsville said about 
the impact of the statutory changes. There is nothing in either Hammond or Wellsville 
that will support an adverser continuing to receive a benefit from adverse use after the 
law changed. To the contrary, the very purpose of the statutory changes was to eliminate 
such benefit. As stated in Wellsville, "subsequently at the 1939 session, see Laws of 
Utah, 1939, Ch. I l l , the legislature adopted amendments [plural] designed to prevent the 
acquisition of a right to water already appropriated by another, solely by adverse user." 
137 P.2d at 639, emphasis added. 
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III. New Escalante Fails to Demonstrate any Statutory or Solid Case Law 
in Support of Acquiring a Water Right by Adverse Use After 1939. 
New Escalante completely fails to confront the statutory changes of 1935 and 
1939 or the definitive observations by this court in the Wellsville decision. Moreover it 
glosses over the case law claimed to support its position. It places unexamined reliance 
on Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1221, (n. 19) (Utah 2000). 
Concerning Silver Fork, New Escalante represents: 
"In making its analysis, the court discussed Wellsville and Mitchell.... 
The Silver Fork court used these two cases to demonstrate that adverse 
possession claims may be initiated prior to 1939 and ripen into title through 
adverse possession upon establishing seven years of continuous use. (Resp. 
Brief at p. 6, underlining added). 
This statement is misleading and unsupportable. Silver Fork does not engage in an 
analysis, nor does it discuss the cited cases, or demonstrate how they support the court's 
conclusory statement. The Silver Fork treatment of the subject is limited to footnote 19 
which provides: 
19. Before 1939, Utah law allowed a party to obtain title to use of 
water by adverse possession. See Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 28, 66 
P.2d 894, 900-01 (1937). Following an amendment to Utah's Water Code 
in 1939, adverse use that began before 1939 could still ripen into title after 
the effective date of the Act. See Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irr. 
Co., 1 Utah 2d 313, 317, 265 P.2d 1036, 1019(1954); Wellsville East Field 
Irr. Co. v. Lindsey Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448, 460-66, 137 P.2d 
634, 640 (1943). However, adverse use commenced after the effective date 
of the act could not ripen into title by adverse possession: "[N]o right to the 
use of water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by 
adverse use or adverse possession." 1939 Utah Laws ch. 111, § 1. 
5 P.3d at 1221. If the Silver Fork court would have analyzed Wellsville, it would have 
discovered that it upheld adverse user only "during that period between 1903 and 1939," 
6 
137 P.2d at 639-640, and only protected an adversers right "vesting prior to 1939." Id. 
Similarly, what Silver Fork has attributed to Mitchell will not withstand scrutiny. The 
supporting language in Mitchell is limited to a single sentence which provides: 
Plaintiffs' claim to the waters in question is based on adverse user from 
1899 to 1939; since which date the initiation of water rights by this method 
has been precluded by statute. 
265 P.2d at 1019, emphasis added. Otter Creek has previously argued that use of the 
word "initiation" was not intended to convey what Silver Fork and the district judge 
below have attributed to it. After additional research, that now appears certain. 
The briefs filed in this court in the Mitchell appeal and a careful reading of the 
decision reveal that both the parties and the court were aware that adverse use after the 
1939 amendments did not qualify. Ernest W. Mitchell was the plaintiff and respondent in 
the case which bears his name. In his brief, filed on May 13, 1953, he acknowledged 
both in his statements of facts and in his argument that his claimed water right based on 
adverse use had to be established before the statutory amendments of 1939. And this was 
so even though his adverse use continued at least until 1944 and perhaps until his lawsuit 
was filed in the early 1950's. (Supreme Court Brief of Respondent at pages 18-19, 
photocopy attached hereto as Addendum 1). In his statement of facts, Mitchell advised 
this court: 
The basis of his claim is that. . . he acquired the remaining five c.f.s. by 
adverse use against the corporate defendants during the period between the 
date of the McCarty decree, 1899, and the effective date of the amendment 
to § 100-3-1, Utah Code, 1943, barring the acquisition of water rights by 
adverse use or possession. 
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Id. at 4-5. Similarly, in the argument portion of his brief, Mitchell readily acknowledged 
the time limitations for establishing a water right by adverse use: 
We are dealing in this case with the period of time between 1899, 
when the McCarty Decree was entered adjudicating the waters of the 
Spanish Fork River, of which Thistle Creek is a tributary, and the year 
1939, when the legislature by an amendment to the statutes relating to the 
appropriation of water rights so as to prohibit the acquisition of such rights 
by adverse use and possession. This is a period of 39 years. 
The plaintiff established his right to the use of the water if his 
evidence shows that he and his predecessors in interest and in title used it 
adversely to the corporate defendants during any seven consecutive years 
within that period. 
Id. at page 8, emphasis added. [Citing Hammond v. Johnson, supra, Wellsville East Field 
Irr. Co. v. Lindsey Land & Livestock, supra, and Jackson v. Spanish Fork West Field Irr. 
Co., et al, 223 P.2d 827 (Utah 1940)]. 
We need not look beyond the four corners of the Mitchell opinion to undermine 
the argument erroneously attributed to it. In rejecting an argument that adverse use ran 
against parties other than the corporate defendants, the Mitchell court ruled: "The only 
direct proof supporting this contention relates to use in the 1940 's, after the 1939 cutoff 
date for adverse possession." 268 P.2d at 962, emphasis added. The 1939 "cutoff date 
was again recognized in a decision of this court seven years later: 
Proof of water by adverse use is difficult. Our territorial statutes recognize 
such a right as did our judicial decisions after statehood until made 
ineffective thereafter by the 1939 legislature. So appellants could acquire 
water rights by adverse use only by continuous adverse use for seven years 
after the 1919 decree and before the 1939 statute. 
In Re Drainage Area of Bear River, 361 P.2d 406, 410 (Utah 1961), emphasis added. 
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The position taken by the court in Wellsville, Mitchell and Bear River was 
reinforced in a 1978 summary on Utah water law authored by Richard L. Dewsnup and 
Dallin W. Jensen and published by the J. Reuben Clark Law School: 
Prior to 1939, much confusion existed in Utah regarding the relationship 
between adverse use or adverse possession and the doctrines of 
abandonment and statutory forfeiture. As previously noted, the exclusive 
method today for acquiring water rights in Utah is by appropriation. The 
Utah Code now states that "no right to the use of water either appropriated 
or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession." 
Therefore, any possible claims of a right arising by adverse use must have 
matured before the 1939 amendment to the Code. This requires the 
assertion of a hostile claim of title, with the knowledge and acquiescence of 
the owner, continuously for seven years before 1939, 
Summary of Utah Real Property Law, Vol. II at 628, emphasis added. Photocopy 
attached hereto as Addendum 2. 
By 1984 when Professor Swenson published "A Primer of Utah Water Law" there 
appears to have been some 45 years of consistent recognition that the 1939 statutory 
amendments cutoff adverse use rights that were not "mature" or "vested." Swenson cites 
Wellsville and Mitchell for a contrary position, but offers no analysis of how either 
decision supports his conclusion. In reality, they do not. While Swenson thought the 
court had left the door open on adverse use, he disagreed with the concept. With respect 
to Hammond, he stated: "The court seemed to regard the forfeiture statute as suspended 
during the period of adverse use. That is difficult to accept." Swenson, A Primer of Utah 
Water Law: Parti JOURNAL OF ENERGY AND POLICY, VOL. 5, 165 at 190, Addendum 3 
attached. Swenson's comment seems more in the nature of chiding the court rather than 
analyzing the cited cases. 
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The best and most thoroughly supported discussion of the subject and how the law 
developed appears in the treatises of Wells A. Hutchins on western states water law: 
In the late 1930's, the relationship of abandonment and forfeiture to adverse 
use in connection with title to Utah water rights were in a state of considerable 
uncertainty. 
In 1939, the Utah Legislature took action by so amending the water 
appropriation statute as to prevent the acquisition of a right to the use of water 
already appropriated by another, solely by adverse use. To this end, the 
general statement of the exclusive method of appropriating water by first 
making application to the State Engineer in the manner provided in the statute, 
and not otherwise, ends with the declaration, "No right to the use of water 
either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or 
adverse possession." In addition, the statutory forfeiture section includes the 
following sentence: "The provisions of this section are applicable whether 
such unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to waste or is used by 
others without right." 
In the opinions in a number of subsequent cases, the Utah Supreme Court has 
noted that since this enactment, it is no longer possible to acquire a right to use 
of water in Utah by adverse possession and use. 
However, after the 1939 legislation was enacted, a period of uncertainty 
ensued as to whether title by adverse possession could have been acquired 
between 1903 and 1939. Prior to 1903, when the legislature provided for an 
exclusive method of appropriating water, the Utah law was well settled that 
title could be acquired by adverse use. What, then was the situation between 
1903 and 1939? The uncertainty, according to the Utah Supreme Court in the 
1943 Wellsville case, resulted from litigation in the 1937-1938 Hammond and 
Adams cases and the 1903 and subsequent 1939 legislation. So, to settle the 
question, the Utah court in the Wellsville case reverted to the Hammond case, 
in which it was held that the forfeiture statutes prior to 1939 did not apply to a 
situation in which failure to use water was a result of an unlawful diversion by 
another, and that title could therefore be acquired by adverse use. "We think 
that this attains a desirable result and conclude that title could between 1903 
and 1939 be acquired by adverse possession. Implicit in this holding is the 
holding that adverse use will not work a statutory forfeiture." 
Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, Vol. II at 406-407, 
emphasis by author, internal citations omitted. Photocopy attached as Addendum 4. 
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The Hammond holding that adverse use will not work a statutory forfeiture, was 
the specific target of the 1939 legislature. When the interaction between the legislature 
and the supreme court is understood, the significance and clarity of the 1939 statutory 
amendments come clearly into focus. The legislature wanted to put an end to acquiring 
water rights by adverse use and it did so by the simple tool of providing that a right could 
not be acquired in this manner (§ 100-3-1, now codified at UCA § 73-3-1), and that use of 
water by "others without right," was to be treated the same as if the water were 
"permitted to run to waste." § 100-1-4, now codified at UCA § 73-1-4. This latter 
provision made it inevitable that a water right would revert to the public after five years 
of nonuse by the appropriator. It permanently closed the door on acquiring a water right 
by adverse use. 
IV. To the Extent of Any Forfeited Water, it Would Simply Feed the Already 
Decreed Rights in the Sevier River Basin. 
New Escalante erroneously claims that if the water in question reverted to the 
public based upon nonuse for five years, it would not benefit Otter Creek since it has not 
refiled on this water. This issue was briefly addressed in Wellsville, 137 P.2d at 640: 
Even though title were to revert to the public, it is unlikely that it would be 
available for appropriation by filing with the State Engineer for on 
practically every stream in this State there are junior appropriators whose 
applications have been approved by the State Engineer for a total of more 
water than ordinarily is available in the stream. The reversion of this water 
would then go to feed these rights of the junior appropriators. The net 
result of a holding that forfeiture resulted after five years of adverse use 
would be to have the water revert to the junior appropriators to feed their 
rights. 
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The Sevier River was fully adjudicated in the Richlands litigation resulting in the 
issuance of the decree on November 30, 1936. (TR 747, Second Memo. Dec. p. 4, TR 
907). The waters in question are at the highest reaches of the watershed. They are 
governed by fixed distribution formulas at every downstream point where water is 
extracted from feeder streams or the Sevier River itself. (Cox Decree, 232 page 
published volume, original on file in Millard County, copies widely available). The 
distribution formulas adapt as the quantity available for distribution ebbs or flows. Id. 
No adjustment will be required as a result of the outcome of this litigation. Moreover, 
Otter Creek hastens to point out that under its view of the evidence, any waters that have 
flowed to New Escalante over the years would be minor. {See Hydrologist Robinson 
Affidavit, f 16, TR 279). In fact, New Escalante sought to justify its major earthwork 
because ice dams in the small ditch historically caused washouts sending even the modest 
amount which they could historically claim on down natural channels into the East Fork 
of the Sevier River. (TR 363). The district court in its initial memorandum decision 
viewed New Escalante's evidence this way: 
7. The ditch is subject to spring-time flowing and freezing cycles. 
a. Water flows during the day and then freezes at night. The 
next day's water flow is blocked by the previous night's ice, 
causing the water to overflow the ditch banks and wash them 
out. 
b. The flood - and overflow - water flows into the Sevier River 
system while the remainder continues on the down the ditch 
into the Escalante River system. 
c. The defendant annually restores and maintains the ditch 
banks to direct the water flow to The Gap. This started with 
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the use of horses and scrapers and then progressed into 
mechanized equipment in the 1930's. 
(TR 462-463. Also Appendix 1 to New Escalante Resp. Brief at page 6.)3 
IV, A Law is not Retroactive Merely Because a Part of the Factual Situation 
to Which it is Applied Occurred Prior to its Enactment 
Assuming arguendo that New Escalante commenced adversely using water 
decreed to Otter Creek on December 1, 1936, the day following entry of the Cox Decree, 
it would have been 56 months short of having a vested water right under the doctrine of 
adverse use. The court did not rule that New Escalante had a "vested right" or a "vested 
protectable property interest," but by implication ruled that it had a right to have the law 
remain unchanged. This concept runs afoul of long established law in Utah and 
elsewhere. An accurate and concise statement of the law is found in Frisbie v. Sunshine 
Mining Company, 457 P.2d 408, 411 (Idaho 1969), in which the court held: 
A law is not retroactive merely because part of the factual situation to 
which it is applied occurred prior to its enactment; rather, a law is 
retroactive only when it operates upon transactions which have been 
completed or upon rights which have been acquired or upon obligations 
which have existed prior to its passage. 2 Sutherland, Statutory 
Construction, § 2202, p. 117 (3d ed. 1943); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 412, p. 980. 
457 P.2d at 411. See also, the definition of "retrospective or retroactive law" in the 1999 
version of 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 407, p. 565, which cites Frisbie. 
This should not be construed as a finding of fact as indeed there have been no 
evidentiary hearing and fact findings. This is reflective of New Escalante's evidence. 
See e.g. Melvin Alvey Affidavit f^ 5 which states that "maintenance of the ditch . . . 
became necessary because of the fact that sections of it would wash out as the snow pack 
would thaw and snow and ice would clog the ditch." TR 363. 
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Frisbie draws on the earlier decision of this court in Silver King Coalition Mines 
Co. v. Industrial Com 'n, 268 P.2d 689 (Utah 1954). Silver King states: 
The statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws on antecedent 
facts for its operation. . . . The law is retrospective in its legal sense, which 
takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws. . . . 
Id. at 692. Further, 
It is often said that a right is not "vested" unless it is something more than 
such a mere expectation as may be based upon an anticipated continuation 
of the present laws. 
Id. 
The principles enunciated in Silver King were also applied in State v. Shipler, 869 
P.2d 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994). Though a criminal case, the court cited Silver King (at 
970) and reached out to principles that have general application: 
Analyzing the vesting of rights in other contexts suggests that rights accrue 
only when the prerequisites for filing an action are fulfilled. For example, 
in an action for wrongful birth and wrongful life, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the cause did not accrue until the birth of the gravely ill child 
because, until that time, neither the parents nor the child had suffered the 
injury necessary to sustain their causes of action in tort. Payne ex rel. 
Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188-90 (Utah 1987). 
"The true test is to ascertain the time when the plaintiffs] 
could first have maintained [their] action to a successful 
result. A cause of action accrues when the person in whose 
favor it arises is first entitled to institute a judicial proceeding 
for the enforcement of his [or her] rights." 
Id, at 189 (quoting 1 Am^nr2d Actions § 88 (1962)); accord Gay Hill 
Field Serv. v. Board of Review, 750 P.2d 606, 609 (Utah App. 1988). 
A controlling principle in Shipler is that "no one has a vested right in any rule of law." 
Id. at 970, quoting Berry ex rel v. Beech Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985), which 
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in turn quoted Masich v. United States Smelting Co., 191 P.2d 612, 624, appeal 
dismissed, 355 U.S. 866 (1948). 
Surprisingly New Escalante cites Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 
1988). Like other authorities, it talks in terms of protecting "vested rights." It reinforces 
the argument made by Otter Creek in its opening brief. The law protects "vested 
protectable property interests" against subsequent changes in the law. Bagford v. 
Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Utah 1995). It does not protect "a mere expectation 
as may be based upon an anticipated continuation of the present laws." Silver King at 
692. 
New Escalante quotes Judge Hoyt's concurring opinion in Wellsville for the 
proposition that the 1939 "amendment [to the water appropriation statute] is not 
retroactive." (Resp. Brief at p. 8). But New Escalante misunderstands Judge Hoyt's 
observation. Taken in context, it does not support New Escalante's position and quite 
clearly cuts the other way. Judge Hoyt states: 
The legislature in 1939 amended the law to expressly provide that non-use 
by the owner of a water right for a period of five years will cause the water 
to revert to the state "whether such unused or abandoned water is permitted 
to run to waste or is used by others without right." By that amendment, the 
legislature has made it unmistakably clear that water rights cannot now be 
acquired by adverse user. It might be said that the amendment of the 
statute makes it unimportant to discuss the matter at length at this time. 
The amendment is not retroactive, however, and it is therefore important 
that we avoid an erroneous interpretation of the law existing between 1897 
and 1939. 
137 P.2d at 656, emphasis added. 
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Judge Hoyt's comment serves to emphasize that the 1939 amendments are not to 
be applied between 1897 and 1939. That would have been retroactive. He is equally 
emphatic that after 1939 "water rights cannot now be acquired by adverse user." Hoyt 
does not consider post 1939 as retroactive. He simply recognizes the effective date of the 
amendments as the line of demarcation. Water rights previously vested would not be 
impacted by the change in the law. 
V. Otter Creek Does Not Ask This Court to Overrule Any Prior Decision. 
Otter Creek asks this court to distinguish the Silver Fork decision based on two 
controlling considerations. First, Silver Fork concerned adverse use which commenced 
in the 1940's, and therefore did not overlap the statutory changes of 1939. f^ 44, ^  47, 5 
P.3d at 1220, 1221. Second, the cases cited by Silver Fork do not support its observation 
that adverse use which commenced prior to the statutory changes of 1939 could ripen into 
a perfected right after those changes became effective. The court's volunteered comment 
in a footnote is without supporting foundation in statutory or case law. The holding and 
the necessary legal rulings woven throughout Silver Fork remain good law. The court's 
dicta on this one minor point is not good law and should be disavowed. It can be done 
without upsetting the essential thrust of Silver Fork in any material manner. 
CONCLUSION 
Water rights based on adverse use that were vested as of the effective date of the 
1939 amendments were not impacted by the statutory changes. They were allowed to 
stand under the doctrine announced in Hammond and supported by Wellsville. 
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The 1939 amendment drew a line. The uncertainty that had persisted and 
intensified in the 1920's and 1930's was brought to an end. No right could thereafter be 
acquired by adverse use and such use was treated the same as if the water were allowed 
to run to waste. Even under its view of the evidence, New Escalante was some 56 
months short of having a vested water right when adverse use was outlawed. 
The 1939 statutory changes did not alter the 28 months of adverse use which New 
Escalante had logged under its version of the facts, but it did draw a line after which it 
could not further perfect a water right from using water decreed to someone else in 
violation of the Cox Decree and in violation of statutes prohibiting the conversion or 
diversion of water under the control of a water commissioner. Any expectation that New 
Escalante had that it could continue this prohibited conduct and eventually established a 
water right did not rise to the level of a "vested protectable property interest" exempt 
from legislative correction. 
This court should reverse the district court and direct it to enter judgment, 
1. Decreeing that New Escalante has no interest in the waters in question and 
that they remain subject to the general adjudication decree of the Sevier River entered on 
November 30, 1936; 
2. Enjoining and restraining New Escalante from any further diversion or use 
of the water in question; 
3. Ordering New Escalante to submit an engineering plan for reversal of the 
excavation and earthwork and for restoring the natural geography and revegetating the 
surface; 
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4. Reserving jurisdiction until a plan for restoration and revegetation has been 
fully carried out to the satisfaction of the State Engineer and the court; and 
5. Allowing Otter Creek to go forward with its claim for damages together 
with costs. 
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— vs. — 
SPANISH FORK WEST FIELD 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, a Corpo 
ration, et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
L 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
We feel that it will be helpful to the court if we make 
our own brief statement of the facts. 
(1) 
The Character of the Land. 
The land with which the case is concerned on this 
appeal lies in the river bottom, adjacent to Thistle Creek, 
part being on the west side and part on the east, sloping 
toward the river, so that water applied to the land for 
irrigation naturally drains back into the stream, both on 
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the surface and under the surface. There are three or 
four small tracts in all, the evidence being in conflict as 
to the exact acreage in each tract and as to the total. 
These tracts lie in rather narrow strips between the 
stream and the ditches and foothills, the axis being 
parallel with the stream. 
The soil is a sandy, gravelly loam and clay mixture, 
very pervious to water and requiring liberal and frequent 
applications of water to produce crops of grass and clover 
for pasturage for livestock. All the witnesses agree to 
this, but defendants' experts opined that there is more 
clay in the soil than our expert, Dr. Farnsworth, was able 
to find by his analysis. 
Dr. Farnsworth testified that in some of his samples 
as much as 88 per cent of the water applied to the sur-
face of the land is lost through percolation, which, of 
course, goes back into the stream. He took many samples 
on all the tracts and analyzed them to determine their 
water holding capacities and needs for the production of 
crops, particularly for the kinds of crops which have been 
raised thereon throughout the years. 
The lands have been devoted to pasturage for live-
stock, producing red top, timothy, clover and grasses, 
which require much more water and its application more 
often than such crops as alfalfa and grains. 
Our witnesses testified that it is necessary to run the 
water over the land at least once in every seven or eight 
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days during the season, and that they had been using the 
water that often in all the ditches, and that it was neces-
sary to use the water to keep the crops green and grow-
ing ; that if they were not watered about that often, they 
burned and the land dried out. 
Our witnesses, aside from Dr. Farnsworth, were men 
who had lived on the land and farmed it and their neigh-
bors ; some of them being acquainted with the farm ever 
since plaintiff's father went up there to homestead. 
(2) 
The Ditches. 
There are three ditches referred to: The Collett, the 
Minnedoka and the Winward. 
The Collett is the southernmost and waters land on 
the west side of the stream; next in order, comiiig down 
stream toward the north, is the Minnedoka, which also 
waters land on the west side; and lastly, the Winward, 
which waters land on the east side and near the house. 
Prior to the construction of the railroad through the can-
yon the Collett and the Minnedoka took out at separate 
dams and~ the run-off from the land under the Collett 
ditch was into the Minnedoka; but when the construction 
of the railroad destroyed the Minnedoka dam and head 
of the ditch, the Collett ditch was extended to intersect 
the Minnedoka, so that now they use but one dam in the 
stream. Other land owners north of plaintiff's farm use 
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the ditches, so there is water in them even when it is 
not plaintiff's turn to use the water. 
The carrying capacity of each of the ditches is esti-
mated at about 2.5 to 3 e, f. s. 
(3) 
The Water Bight — Claimed — Used — Allowed 
The plaintiff in his complaint laid claim to the right 
to the use of 2.5 c. f. s., during the irrigation season, 
through each of said ditches, or a total of 7.5 c. f. s., for 
a period of 24 hours, once each week, usually on Mondays, 
for the irrigation of his pastures and to a continuous flow 
through the Win ward ditch to water his stock and to keep 
his well supplied. 
This right which he claims is in addition to certain 
rights which he has on Thistle creek and which were es-
tablished by the McCarty Decree, which was entered 
April 20,1899, and in addition to certain exchange rights 
which he has by reason of his ownership of Strawberry 
reservoir rights, the latter having been purchased by his 
father and predecessor in 1916. 
The basis of his claim is that he got a right to use 
2.5 c. f. s. through the Coilett ditch from his father, hi3 
predecessor, who purchased the land lying south of the 
Mitchell homestead from Caroline Coilett in 1900, this 
right being appurtenant to the land and not included 
in the McCarty Decree; and that he acquired the remain-
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ing 5 c. f. s. by adverse use against the corporate defend-
ants during the period between the date of the McCarty 
Decree, 1899, and the effective date of the amendment 
to Section 100-3-1, Utah Code, 1943, barring the acquisi-
tion of water rights by adverse use or possession. 
Laws of Utah 1939, Chapter 111, Sec. 100-3-1, 
page 148. 
The land, aside from the Collett tract, is embraced 
in the David A. Mitchell homestead. He went up there 
and homesteaded in 1889 or 1890. 
The water rights which are claimed for the Collett 
purchase were not adjudicated in the case which resulted 
in the McCarty Decree, as Collett was not a party to 
that action; hence the decree is no bar to the claim to such 
rights. But David A. Mitchell was a party to that ac-
tion, his rights then existing on the stream, aside from 
the Collett right, were adjudicated and he was awarded 
certain high water rights. 
Our evidence is substantially without conflict with 
respect to the continued use of the water through all three 
ditches at the same time, at least once each week during 
the season; to the use of about 2 to 2.5 c. f. s. in each 
ditch; to the effect that it took about that much water to 
flood it over the land; that if the land was not watered 
about that often, the grass would burn and the land dry 
out; and that the pastures, throughout the years, were 
kept green and growing, except in one or two dry years; 
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that they always, except in winter, kept a stream in the 
Win ward ditch, which furnished water for the stock in the 
pasture through which that ditch coursed; that in the 
winter when the water was out of the ditch the water in 
the well lowered until it was insufficient for the house-
hold and dairy uses. 
Of course, the defendants' experts testified that in 
their judgment no such quantity of water could be used 
beneficially on such a small acreage of land; they went 
even farther and held that this land did not need more 
than 1 c. f. s. to 60 acres of land and that irrigation once 
in two weeks would be ample. 
There is a conflict in the evidence as to just how 
much land is irrigated. 
(4) 
Both Sides Appeal 
The court made findings and entered judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff but awarded him only 2.5 c. f. s. for 
12 hours, once each week, to use through any or all of the 
ditches, with a flow through the Winward for stockwater-
ing and to keep the well supplied. 
Both sides appeal. 
(5) 
The Principal Issues 
The burden of the defendants' claim is that the evi-
dence does not sustain the findings and judgment in 
plaintiff's favor, that plaintiff has failed to prove the 
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right to the use of any water out of Thistle creek except 
his McCarty Decree water and his Strawberry exchange 
water; while plaintiff contends that the decree awards 
too little and that the evidence justifies and requires a 
substantial increase of the award. 
There are other claims, which will be noticed in the 
course of the argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS AND THE 
JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S FAVOR AWARDING HIM THE 
RIGHT TO THE USE OF 2.5 c. f. s. OF WATER FROM THIS-
TLE CREEK DURING THE IRRIGATION SEASON FOR THE 
IRRIGATION OF HIS PASTURES AND TO A CONTINU-
OUS FLOW THROUGH THE WINWARD DITCH FOR HIS 
STOCK AND TO KEEP HIS WELL SUPPLIED. 
POINT 2. 
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIES AND 
REQUIRES FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT IN PLAINTIFF'S 
FAVOR FOR A MUCH LARGER QUANTITY OF WATER, TO 
BE USED THROUGH ANY OR ALL OF THE DITCHES AT 
THE SAME TIME, FOR 24 HOURS ONCE EACH WEEK DUR-
ING THE IRRIGATION SEASON. 
POINT 3. 
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT 
DOES NOT DO FULL JUSTICE TO THE PLAINTIFF BE-
CAUSE THE AWARD IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR HIS NEEDS 
AND DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE PROOF AS TO HIS 
USE OF THE WATER EVER SINCE THE YEAR 1899. 
The foregoing propositions are so closely related 
7 
that it will be sufficient to argue them all together in this 
brief. 
We are dealing in this case with the period of time 
between 1899, when the McCarty Decree was entered 
adjudicating the waters of the Spanish Fork Eiver, of 
which Thistle Creek is a tributary, and the year 1939, 
when the legislature by an amendment to the statutes 
relating to the appropriation of water rights so as to pro-
hibit the acquisition of such rights by adverse use and 
possession. This is a period of 39 years. 
The plaintiff established his right to the use of the 
water if his evidence shows that he and his predecessors 
in interest and in title used it adversely to the corporate 
defendants during any seven consecutive years within 
that period. 
Hammond v. Johnson, 94 U. 20, 66 P. 2d 894; 
Wellsville East Field Irr. Co. v. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co., 104 I I 448, 456,137 
P. 2d 634, 638, rehearing denied 104 U. 498, 
143 P. 2d 278; 
Jackson v. Spanish Fork West Field Irr. Co., 
et al., 223 P. 2nd 827. 
The evidence is ample to prove that plaintiff and 
his predecessor did so use the water all during that entire 
period. What few interruptions that did occur, if any, 
were not sufficient to destroy the right, but only empha-
size the use. 
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David A. Mitchell, plaintiff's father and predecessor, 
on this point testified: 
He went there in 1889 or 1890 and filed on a home-
stead. (Tr. 1,2) There was a log cabin on the land and a 
little farming had been done on the bench. (Tr. 3) The 
bench land had been irrigated from Benny Creek and 
Mitchell spring. 
Caroline Collett owned the land south of his home-
stead (Tr. 7) Part of her land was on Thistle Creek. 
This is river bottom country. He wanted it to make pas-
ture of it. He understood it had a good water right 
He saw the water being used on this land. (Tr. 7, 8) 
On the bottom land they raised hay and garden and pas-
ture, potatoes and a little wheat. It produced real good 
crops. This land has to be watered about once a week 
or it dries out. It seems not to hold the water long. I t 
is a kind of sandy loam you have to water about once a 
week to raise crops on it. He purchased 40 acres from 
Caroline Collett in 1903, There were five or six acres in 
the bottom land which he purchased. (Tr. 9) And it was 
on this land that she used this water, which was taken 
out of Thistle Creek. When he bought the land he watered 
it and sowed it to timothy. (Tr. 10) He constructed the 
Collett ditch. (Tr. 11) He later helped construct the 
Minnedoka ditch, which connected with another little 
ditch he had on the land in the pasture. (Tr. 15,16) 
Testifying specifically with respect to the long con-
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tinued use of the water on these pastures, he said: (Tr. 
17) 
"Well I would say the first ten or fifteen 
years we just took it when we wanted it. And 
then—Oh, there was a man by the name of Syler 
bought the Winward place, and he thought he had 
a prior right, and he come up and asked me what 
I was doing about the water, and I told hirn just 
watering the pasture, and we had a little argument 
about that and we sent and got Oberhansley and 
he is the man that fixed that" 
This was soon after the Minnedoka ditch was taken 
out. 
Again, referring to the time when Syler and Ober-
hansley came up: (Tr. 18) 
"A. Well, we decided we was to have the water 
one day every week, and they fixed that Mon-
day I believe. 
Q. Who was to have the water when you say 
V e f 
A. I was. That means me. 
Q. You were to have it every— 
A. Every Monday. 
Q. Every Monday? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On what ditches? 
A. On the Winward ditch and the Minnedoka 
ditch. 
Q. What about the Collett ditch? 
A. Well Mr. Oberhansley never had anything to 
do with that. 
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Q. Did you continue to use the water on the 
Collett Ditch? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How and when f 
A. Whenever I wanted it, I went and took the 
water whenever I wanted it. 
Q. Now after this occasion when Mr. Oberhan-
sley came up, to what extent and amount and 
what times have you used water in the Min-
nedoka and the Winward ditehes? 
A. Well we tried to live up to that, once a week, 
one day a week, 24 hours. 
Q. Would you use both ditches at the same time, 
the Minnedoka and the Winward ditch? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you any judgment as to the amount of 
water you would use in those ditches when 
you would use them on Monday? 
A. Well they both are pretty good ditches, I 
don't know, about two second feet, maybe 
more. 
Q. How long did that use of the water from 
Thistle Creek through the Minnedoka and 
Winward ditches continue while you operated 
that place? 
A. Forever, as long as I stayed there. 
Q. When you would take it on Mondays, how 
long would you keep the water? 
A. 24 hours. 
Q. What would you irrigate with it, what land? 
A. The pasture, the Collett land, and, oh, when 
we was pasturing we watered them all about 
the same time. 




Q. And below the home? 
A. Yes sir, and above the home. 
Q. What land would you irrigate, or did you ir-
rigate, through the Collett ditch other than 
the Collett land? 
A. Well, ain't no other land to water. It runs 
into the Minnedoka ditch and it off the Collett 
land." 
With reference to the time the well was dug, he said 
Jesse Baker dug it about the turn of the century, he 
thinks. (Tr. 20) 
The well is supplied with underground water from 
the Winward ditch. The well always got very dry when 
the water was out of the ditch in the winter time. (Tr. 21) 
He further testified that during all the time he was 
there he never did draw any McCarty Decree water or 
Strawberry exchange water through any of these three 
ditches. (Tr. 22) 
The deed to the farm was made to the plaintiff in 
1931. (Tr. 50) 
The above testimony of this witness clearly shows 
that from about the second year after he homesteaded 
until he left there or deeded the property to his son in 
1931, he used about 2 c. f. s. of the water of the stream 
through all three of the ditches at the same time when-
ever he wanted it up to the time he had the dispute with 
Syler, and thereafter he continued to use the stream 
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through the Collett ditch at will and through the Minne-
doka and Winward every Monday for 24 hours at a 
turn. 
This use continued even after the date of the Me-
Carty Decree- So, although this witness was a party to 
the action which brought about that decree and might 
be said to be estopped thereby from claiming the rights 
now asserted through the Minnedoka and Winward, he 
nevertheless continued to use this water just the same 
as before; and thereby he acquired a new right by ad-
verse use against these corporate defendants. And let it 
be remembered that the Collett right was not involved 
in the McCarty Decree. He also continued to make the 
same use of the water from Thistle Creek through these 
ditches even after the purchase of the Strawberry right 
and after the organization of the Clinton Irrigation Com-
pany. He drew his McCarty Decree right and his Straw-
berry right by tickets from that company, and he used 
that water on the bench land and not on these pastures. 
It is argued in appellants' brief that he deeded all his 
water rights on Thistle Creek to the Clinton Irrigation 
Company and so lost any of these rights which he now 
claims. But evidently he did not think so, nor did the 
Clinton Irrigation Company, nor any of these corporate 
defendants, nor even the water commissioners on the 
river; for nobody ever objected to his continuing to use 
these waters just as before. He was never disturbed 
in this use. He was arrested once for taking water out 
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of turn, but that was for taking it out of Benny Creek 
and not for taking any of these waters. 
The correct appraisal of the situation seems to be 
that the Clinton Irrigation Company took over the dis-
tribution of the McCarty Decree water and the Straw-
berry water and did not have anything to do with the 
rights claimed under any of these three ditches. 
The use was not clandestine, there was no stealing 
of water in the night time, there was no attempt to con-
ceal the use; the use was open and notorious and under 
a claim of right Any person passing by the property 
or walking up and down the stream could see these pas-
tures, would know that the grasses thereon did not grow 
without irrigation, could see the cattle in the pastures 
and the use to which the ditches were being put. All 
the landowners in the vicinity must have known about 
the Mitchell property; they could not help but be aware 
of the fact that this man was using water which did not 
come within the McCarty Decree or the Strawberry pur-
chase. The water commissioners must have known about 
it and so must the members of the committee represent-
ing the corporate defendants. 
There is no evidence to show that Mitchell did not get 
along all right with Winward and Oberhansley, who also 
used water through the Winward and Minnedoka ditches, 
respectively. But when Syler bought the Winward plac«, 
a dispute arose between Syler and Mitchell about the use 
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of the water in the Winward ditch. This dispute was 
compromised, through Oberhansley as mediator, and 
thereafter Mitchell limited his turns on this ditch to 24 
hours beginning every Monday morning. 
The testimony of the witness David A. Mitchell con-
cerning his long continued use of the rigths which plain-
tiff now claims stands without any substantial evidence in 
opposition; and it is corroborated by the testimony of 
several witnesses. 
R L. Mitchell, brother of plaintiff, (Tr. 51) lived 
on this place until about 1913. He is 56 years old. He 
remembers when the Minnedoka ditch was built, about 
1919 or 1920. (Tr. 54) As long as he can remember the 
lands produced red top, timothy and clover. (Tr. 55) 
To produce such crops this land has to be irrigated pretty 
near continuously, it has to be kept wet to produce pas-
ture. During the time he was there he used to irrigate 
this land through these ditches. The water when he was 
there was kept in the Collett ditch continuously and 
they would change it at least once each day. Part of the 
time they put in over the lower end and then they went 
back to the top. They used about a second foot, he said. 
He testified on cross examination (Tr. 70) that as 
far back as he could remember there were about five 
acres on the east side of the creek irrigated out of the 
Winward and twelve acres on the west side irrigated out 
of the Collett and Minnedoka. 
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Ernest W. Mitchell, plaintiff, (Tr. 72) testified that 
he was 41 years old; he was born on this ranch. He could 
remember back 29 or 30 years. (Tr. 74) He purchased 
the ranch in 1934. His testimony concerning these three 
ditches commences on page 76 of the Transcript Com-
mencing at page 83, his testimony is to the effect: 
It has been his custom to water the five acres under 
the Minnedoka once a week; such was the practice before 
he bought the place. On both the Minnedoka and the 
Winward the main purpose of those ditches is to supply 
Sid Elmer's prior right, the witness being a small owner 
in them. The water is never turned out of the Winward 
ditch. (Tr. 84) On these two ditches he used the water 
once a week, preferably on Mondays. He used from all 
three ditches at the same time; about two to two and a 
half in the Winward ditch and two in the Minnedoka 
ditch and about two second feet in the Collett ditch. He 
took his turns once a week; he entered into an agreement 
with Mr. Francis (the water commissioner) that he would 
use these three ditches once a week. The water had been 
used in that manner as far back as he can remember. 
(Tr. 86) 
He further testified that prior to 1944 no McCarty 
Decree water was ever used on the pastures. (Tr. 88) All 
the McCarty Decree water and Strawberry water was 
used on the bench through the Mitchell ditch. 
We quote: (Tr. 89) 
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"Q. And as I understand your testimony, once a 
week, generally on Monday, you would draw 
approximately two and one half second feet 
of water into each of those three ditches, Col-
lett, Minnedoka, and Winward? 
A, Yes sir." 
Furthermore, he testified that he and Wayne Fran-
cis, the water commissioner entered into an agreement 
in 1944 (Tr. 90) whereby he was to be charged against 
his McCarty Decree water for one second foot through 
the Collett ditch, and that he would use 2.5 second feet 
through the Collett, 2.5 through the Winward and 2-5 
through the Minnedoka, all at the same time, for 24 hours, 
once a week. 
This witness further testified, on cross examination, 
(Tr. 106), that the arrangement with respect to the use 
of the McCarty Decree water and the transfer of the 
Strawberry water applied only to the waters of the Mit-
chell ditch; and that on the Minnedoka ditch and ihe 
Winward ditch and the Collett ditch no one ever shut the 
water off or turned it to him or told him that he was 
drawing Strawberry water on that until Cliff Jex told 
him that he did not have any right to it and that he would 
shut it off. And he said to Jex: "Well I will turn it back 
on and you just as well arrest me right now." 
So according to the testimony of this witness, from 
1934, when he purchased the property, until 1944, when 
he entered into the treaty with Wayne Francis, that he 
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used the water through these three ditches, on the pas-
tures without taking any charge against his McCarty 
Decree or Strawberry exchange rights, (Tr. 117) 
This witness' testimony not only corroborates that 
of his father, but standing alone and in and of itself, 
is sufficient to support the finding and to justify a muck 
larger award than the court allowed him. His testimony 
shows an adverse use for a period of ten full years. 
There is other evidence in the record corroborative 
of the above concerning the adverse use of the water from; 
1899 and before right down to the commencement of 
this action. 
See: 
Ernest W. Mitchell, on redirect, Tr. 131 to 
133. 
James Hicks, Tr. 136 to 147. 
Frost Mitchell, Tr. 150 to 156, inclusive and 
160. 
Wayne Francis, a witness for appellants, Tr. 
205, 213, 215, 216, 225 to 232, inclusive. 
Burgess Larsen, a witness for appellants, Tr, 
265, 266. 
Victor P. Sabin, a witness for appellants, Tr. 
273, 278, 280 to 283, inclusive. 
Orla Stewart, a witness for appellants, Tr. 
300, 302. 
Sidney Elmer, a witness for plaintiff, Tr. 441 
to 445. 
We submit to this court the proposition that the evi-
dence without conflict shows that plaintiff and his pre-
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decessor used the water adversely to the corporate de-
fendants throughout all the years from 1899, and before, 
right down to the year 1944. During that period there 
was no charge made against either the McCarty Decree 
or the Strawberry exchange water right for the water 
used through these three ditches. Plaintiff has therefore 
established his right to the use of some wrater from 
Thistle Creek. 
The extent of his right measured in cubic feet per 
second flow of the streams and the duration of his right 
measured in the hours of his turns present what we re-
gard as the vital questions in this case. We next turn to 
an exposition of those subjects. 
The first point to be considered in this connection is 
the acreage of land irrigated. On this point the evidence 
is conflicting. In his complaint plaintiff alleged that there 
are about 16 acres which were irrigated under all three 
ditches; but when he and his witness Jackson measured 
the tracts they found only a little more than 10 acres al-
together. Defendants' witnesses also measured, omitting, 
however, the ditches and diteh banks, which also grow 
grass and use water, and they found 9.5 acres. The court 
followed their testimony in making its findings. We shall 
not press this point, but we do think the acreage is rather 
scant, considering all the evidence. 
As to the quantity of water diverted and applied to 
the land and the duration of the turns, there is no con-
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flict with the plaintiffs evidence. Prior to the disptn| 
with Syler there were no turns on the ditches. MitehgH 
just helped himself to the water whenever he wanted m 
Up to that time and also thereafter he kept the wat« 
in the Collett ditch almost all the time, starting at iJfl 
top of the land and watering down and then going bao| 
and doing it all over again; and through the Winwai| 
and Minnedoka he helped himself at will, as the water wai 
always in those ditches because Winward and Oberhaji 
sley also used those ditches. After the dispute with Sylal 
Mitchell was limited to turns on the Minnedoka and Wim 
ward to weekly turns of 24 hours each, using both ditchei 
at the same time. 
We have quoted plaintiff's fathers testimony thai 
he used 2 c. f. s., maybe more, through each ditch; anJ 
also the plaintiff's testimony, (Tr. 84-86) to the effed| 
that he used 2 to 2.5 in the Winward, 2 in the Minnedofci 
and 2 in the Collett, and (Tr. 89) that it was about 
7.5 in all three ditches. 
Yet in the face of this evidence the court found thai 
there had been used only 2.5 c. f. s. But this court founJ 
had been used in turns of 24 hours each once each week! 
and then in the judgment cut the time down to 12 hours! 
So it appears beyond all question that plaintifl 
and his predecessor had actually used through these threl 
ditches at the same time, or at least he had diverted 
20 
through the ditches and spread out upon the land, at least 
6 c. f. s. in the aggregate instead of 2.5 c. f. s. as found 
by the trial court. 
Since 1944 he has been charged 1 c. f. s. against his 
McCarty Decree right on the Collett ditch, leaving 5 
c. f, s. as the minimum of the right which he now claims. 
The finding now being considered is contrary to the 
weight of the evidence. The weight of the evidence shows 
at least 5 c. f. s. as being the amount diverted and used 
and the finding should be according to the proof. 
How much water has been beneficially used? How 
much does plaintiff require, when used economically, to 
produce the pasturage for which these lands are best 
adapted? 
These, we apprehend, are the questions with which 
the court will be deeply concerned. 
It is our claim that the award of 2.5 c. f. s. for 12 
hours once each week during the season is substantially 
only one-half the amount as to time and quantity that 
was and is justified by the evidence. 
The minimum amount diverted according to the 
testimony of our witnesses, and in this respect they are 
not impeached or contradicted by any evidence or testi-
mony, was 6 c. f. s. for 24 hours once each week; and 
that since 1944 there had been a charge of 1 c. f. s. against 
the McCarty Decree right for water taken through the 
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Collett ditch, leaving 5 e. f. s. to be allocated to the 
now in litigation. 
With the use of this 5 c. f. s. plus the 1 c. f. s. 
Carty decreed right the land has always, except in one: 
two drought years, produced good crops of pastur 
In the judgment of our witnesses, who know the land 
have had practical experience in irrigating it and h \: 
had the advantage of years of actual observation, it 
necessary to use a stream of this size in order to fl 
the water over the ground and keep it moist (Tr. 1 
Of course, the consumptive use is not any such qir 
tity, for, according to the testimony of Dr. Farnswo 
who took soil samples and analyzed them to deten 
their water holding capacity, 85 to 90 per cent of 
water applied goes back into the stream, (Tr. 170) It 
go back into the stream because there is no place else f 
it to go. So the actual consumptive use is only at 
10 to 15 per cent of the water applied. 
But it is quite necessary, as plaintiff testified, ([ 
108, that large streams be used in order to get the wax 
over the land within the time allowed; otherwise it sim_ 
sinks down into the gravel and goes back into the stre* 
The defendants and their experts contend for a dtt 
of water on this land of 1 c. f. s. to 60 acres of land, whi 
will give about 3 acre feet throughout an irrigation s 
son of 26 weeks, because this is the duty usually allow 
by the state engineer throughout the state. 
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Such opinions are unreliable because they are based 
upon the assumption that this land and these grass 
crops do not require any more water nor any more fre-
quent applications of water than do the lands and crops 
which we see on every hand in this irrigated country. 
But this is the duty which the court has allowed in 
this case. Applying the formula of 1 c. f. s. to 60 acres 
of land and 3 acre feet to the acre for the season to this 
9.5 acres and 2.5 c. f. s. used for 12 hours once each week 
for 26 weeks, we get an award of a little more than 3.25 
acre feet for this land. 
One of the defendants' experts compared this land 
with the bench land on the west side of Jordan and north 
of the point of the mountain, said it was the same kind 
of clay soil and did not require irrigation more often 
then once in two weeks. The implication of this kind of 
evidence is that since the bench land does not require 
a duty of more than 3 acre feet to the acre this land does 
not require more. There are two fallacies in such reason-
ing: (1) the soils are not comparable, and (2) the crops 
are not the same and their water requirements are quite 
different. But the trial court, nevertheless, seems to have 
based its conclusions and findings in this evidence. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that grass pas-
tures and sandy soil with gravel only a few inches from 
the top soil as we have in this case require more water 
and more frequent applications of water than do the clay 
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lands which we see elsewhere which are used for e r a 
such as the grains and alfalfa and orchards. Jfl 
If this were not true we might expect to see gra|8 
meadows and lush pastures where we now see checked 
fields of grain and hay. 'm 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the grasfl 
grow only in places wrhere there are natural sourcea|l 
water or in favored spots where water can be andH 
applied frequently enough to keep the soil moist throim 
out the summers. jfl 
The grasses and clover which form the meadows em 
pastures have short root systems, they obtain their mm 
ture and food requirements from near the surface of m 
ground; they do not send their roots deep into the earl 
as does alfalfa, for an example, seeking out the wata 
It is for this reason and also because this land is sani 
and gravelly and slopes toward the river that more wa|| 
is required than is needed on other lands and for btfafl 
crops. I 
Irrigation once in every two weeks is sufficient fi 
the usual run of field crops on the lands which lie 1 
every hand. But the pastures and gardens in the citjl 
and towns which are also to be seen on every hand fl 
quire water at least once every week. They require abci 
twice the amount of water that is required on the fari 
ing lands. 
24 
Yet in spite of these well known facts and of the 
testimony of the witnesses who know this land, having 
worked on it and depended upon its productivity for their 
livings, the trial court awarded only a small fraction of 
an acre foot of more than the farming lands are allowed 
by the state engineer. 
For this reason the judgment does not do full justice 
to the plaintiff. For this reason we respectfully submit 
that the judgment ought to be amended to award the 
plaintiff 5 c. f. s. to be used for 24 hours once each week 
during the season. 
One more thought before we leave this part of our 
argument. After the decree was entered the plaintiff 
conformed therewith and during July, 1951, and for the 
rest of that season confined his use to 2.5 e. f. s. for 12 
hour turns once each week, with consequences to his 
pastures little short of disasterous. About one-half of 
the land dried out and the pastures were burned. On 
October 6, 1951, he filed a motion to be permitted to re-
open the case to produce evidence to show to the court 
what happened when he tried to operate under the terms 
of the judgment. He supported his motion by his own 
affidavit and by affidavits sworn to by four other persons 
who had observed conditions. (R. 484, et seq.) 
The court denied this motion, and in so doing we 
think the court erred to our prejudice; for here was en-
tirely new evidence, based upon an actual experiment, 
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which could not have been produced at the trial, for it <| 
not then exist. 
POINT 4. 
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CAS 
HENCE THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE REFUSAL 
THE COURT TO ABATE THE ACTION. 
Under the above heading we will give our answer J 
appellants' arguments, made both by the corporate ap{ 
lants and by the state engineer, under their Points Oi 
Thistle Creek flows from Sanpete, through Ui 
county into Spanish Fork river, thence into Utah 
thence through Jordan river into Salt Lake county.; 
The points of diversion are in Utah county; 
places of use are in Utah county; the interference of 
right was in Utah county. 
The action is for damages for interference with thjl 
right, for an injunction to restrain threatened interfeil 
ence, and for a decree quieting title to the right. 1 
The only persons concerned with the subject of thil 
litigation are the parties to the action; and the interea| 
of the staee engineer does not extend to the question <M 
whether the plaintiff or the defendants are entitled tj | 
the use of the water any more than to know to whom it 
to be distributed. 




"All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done in his person, property or repu-
tation, shall have a remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay • . . " 
The statute reads the same as the constitution. 
Also, Section 5, Article VIII, that: 
"All civil and criminal business arising in any 
county, must be tried in such county, unless a 
change of venue be taken in such cases as may 
be provided by law." 
The statute, Section 104-4-1, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, provides: 
"All actions for the following causes must be 
tried in the county in which the subject of the ac-
tion, or some part thereof, is situated, subject 
to the power of the court to change the place of 
trial as provided in this code: 
"(1) For the recovery of real property or 
of an estate therein, or for the determination in 
any form of such right or interest, and for injuries 
to real property." 
This water right is real property. Wiel, (3rd. ed.), 
Vol. I, p. 37, Sec. 53. It is a right appurtenant to land. 
Section 100-1-10, and 100-1-11, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. 
This water right is appurtenant to land which is 
situated in Utah county, and this action is to quiet title 
to the right which is an incident to that land. Therefore, 
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under the express provisions of Section 104-4-1, Code, thfl 
action is brought in the proper county. m 
There is precedent for our claim that action skouM 
not be abated because of the pendency of the other aq| 
tions mentioned in the opposing briefs. That is the casjj 
of Wellsville East Field Irrig. Co. v. Lindsay Lamd anm 
Livestock Co., Utah , 137 P. 2d 634. This w a s ! 
suit to enforce the Kimball Decree. Each defendant efll 
tered a plea in abatement, just as the defendants havjj 
done in this case. In that case the court cites Spanim 
Fork West Field Irr. Co. v. District Court, 99 Utah 558a 
110 Pac! 2nd 344, to the proposition that not all suitl 
involving water rights have to go through the general a<jl 
judication. The Wellsville case was decided May 141 
1943; rehearing denied in 104 Utah 498. The amendment 
made to Sec. 100-4-4, at the First Special Session in 
1948, does not change the law as it existed when thffl 
Spanish Fork case was decided. 1 
In all cases which require a general adjudication, anffl 
which are referred to the state engineer, the procedural 
shall be as in that act provided and not otherwise. But m 
private suits which do not involve a general adjudical 
tion, the procedure is still as it was in other civil cases,! 
4 
In this case the cause for action arose in Utah countyi 
and after the Salt Lake City v. Anderson case was in4 
stituted. Under Utah Constitution Section 5, Article Vim 
the case was triable in Utah County, and plaintiff had] 
28 
the constitutional right to bring the action in that county 
by the process provided therefor; and there was no at-
tempt made, nor was there any ground for a change of 
venue. 
Counsel for the State Engineer, Appellant, contend 
that Section 734-24 XL C. A. 1953 is mandatory even 
though the statute above uses the word "May", — "any 
interested party may petition the district court in which 
the general adjudication suit is pending to hear and de-
termine said dispute." We contend that if the statute is 
subject to such interpretation it is unconstitutional to 
that extent, and that the Legislature went far beyond its 
power. 
Crane v. Hatilo, 42 Sp. Ct. 214, 258 U. S. 142, 66 L. 
Ed, 514: 
"In determining whether or not due process 
of law has been denied, regard must always be 
had to the character of the proceedings involved 
for the purpose of determining what the practice 
of common law was and what the practice in thii? 
country has been in like cases. Twining v. State 
of N. J., 29 S. Ct. 14 211 U. S. 78, 53 L. Ed. 97." 
In Be Brown's Estate v. NUes, (Calif.) 176 Pac. 477: 
"It is also a well recognized principle that 
where the judicial power of courts, either original 
or appellate, is fixed by constitutional provisions, 
the Legislature can not either limit or extend that 
jurisdiction." (Citing cases.) 
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And the Court can not relinquish that jurisdiction. 
Alexander v, Bennett, 60 N. Y. 204. 
21 Am. Jur., 184: 
". . . Thus, the legislature cannot destroy 
jurisdiction by depriving a party of the right to 
appeal to the courts for redress of a legal wrong, 
nor can it authorize a court to divest itself of con-
stitutionally imposed exclusive jurisdiction/' 
14 Am. Jur., 366, Sec. 163 : 
"Constitutional Provisions. — In the consti-
tutional form of government the three depart-
ments—legislative, executive, and judicial—de-
pend for their powers on the organic law of the 
state. Hence, the Constitution is the common 
source of power and authority of every court, and 
all questions concerning jurisdiction of a court 
must be determined by that instrument, with the 
exception of certain inherent powers which of 
right belong to all courts. Therefore, unless the 
power or authority of a court to perform a con-
templated act can be found in the Constitution 
or the laws enacted thereunder, it is without juris-
diction and its acts are invalid. Thus, while the 
legislature may, within proper bounds, prescribe 
rules of practice and procedure for the exercise 
of jurisdiction by the courts, it can not abridge 
or enlarge powers conferred on them by the Con-
stitution or take away jurisdiction thereby vested 
in them." 
The case of Salt Lake City et al v. Anderson, et al, 
106 Utah 350,148 Pac. 2nd 346, did not overrule the cases 
of Wellsville East Field Irri. Co. v. Lindsay Land and 
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Livestock Co., Utah , 137 Pac, 2nd 634, and Smith 
v. List Court, 69 Utah 493, 256 Pac, 539 in so far as they 
sustain plaintiff's right to prosecute this suit in Utah 
County, and under those decisions and the Constitutional 
provisions aforementioned the District Court of Utah 
County had no power to abate this action. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court had the 
jurisdiction and the power to proceed with the trial of 
this case. The result of this trial will in no way affect the 
outcome of the general adjudication; it will have no more 
effect on the final adjudication in that case than would 
result if the corporate defendants should convey so much 
of their water rights to the plaintiff during the pendency 
of the general adjudication. The rights adjudicated in 
this action can be fitted into the general adjudication by 
the production of a copy of the decree in this case just 
as well as they could be if plaintiff produced a deed of 
conveyance of the water right. The legislature, we think, 
did not intend to send these parties, who all reside in 
Utah county, down to Salt Lake county to try their case, 
which is a private quarrel among themselves; when the 
statutes and the constitution both require that they 
settle their differences in the county where the property 
is situated, 
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' 
POINT NINE 
The defendants failed to prove that they had been 
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damaged by plaintiff's use of the water in 1950 and failed 
to furnish the court with any standard by which to meas-
ure their damages if they sustained any. The water which 
plaintiff used was what he at that time had a right to use, 
it was what he had used all the time up until the court 
cut down his right by the judgment in this case. Even if 
he did in fact turn out into his ditches more water than 
was necessary on his land, the defendants were not there-
by damaged because the excess above his needs ran right 
back into the stream and on down to the defendants* So 
there was no error in the court denying damages to the 
corporate defendants. And the costs follow the judgment, 
as they should do. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the respondent respectfully submits to 
the court — 
(1) That the findings and judgment should be 
amended by this court so as to double the water right of 
the plaintiff, both as to quantity and as to time; and 
(2) That as so amended, the judgment should be 
affirmed; and respondent should be awarded his costs 
on this appeal* 
Res 
Manti, Utah, 
Attorneys for Bespl 
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A, WATER RIGHTS 
1. OWNERSHIP AND TITLE 
a. [§ 14.1] In General1 
By statutory amendment in 1935, "all waters in the state, both 
above and below the ground are property of the public subject to 
all existing rights in the use thereof/'2 This section has been in-
terpreted to mean that water is available to members of the pub-
lic upon compliance with the law and not that title to water is 
vested in the state-3 This section places a duty upon the state to 
control the process of acquiring water rights in a manner that will 
be in the best interest of die public.4 
b. [§ 14.2] Title to Water 
Utah courts have long held that a person cannot acquire an ab-
solute title to water. 
No one owns or can own water in this state, regardless of whether 
that water is found in the form of a spring, stream, lake, pond, or 
under the p'ound. One can only acquire a right to use the water. 
One's right to use water is measured by the amount he puts to ben-
eficial use without interfering with another person's prior right to 
use the water.5 
lAn attempt to understand the complexity and subtle nature of Utah water 
law is best achieved with a background in the history and changes regarding 
water law from territorial days to the present. This chapter will not attempt to 
furnish such an historical perspective. The reader is directed to an excellent 
small treatise on the subject. W. A. Hutchings, THE UTAH LAW OF WATER 
RIGHTS (1965). 
aUTAH'CoDB ANN. § 73-1-1 (1953). 
'Wrathali v. Johnson, 86 Utah SO, 101, 40 P.2d 755 (1935). 
banner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943). 
sMelville v. Salt Lake County, 570 P.2d 687,688 (Utah 1977). 
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used also affects the amount allowed to be appropriated. The 
state engineer must clearly determine the time, period, or season 
when the right to use water exists.31 
e. [§ 14.30] Priority Between Appropriators 
Sections 73-3-1 and 73-3-21 of the Utah Code provide that as 
between appropriators the first in time is the first in right. Prior-
ity of a claim to waters runs from the filing of the application 
with the state engineer, provided that all the requirements for an 
appropriation are met. Each appropriator is entitled to receive his 
whole supply before any subsequent appropriator has any right. 
However, in times of scarcity, domestic and agricultural uses take 
preference over all other uses. 
f. [§ 14.31] Doctrine of Relation Back 
The principle of relation back applies to the appropriation of 
water rights- The priority of an application is determined by the 
date the written application is received in the office of the state 
engineer. It is only a tentative priority, however, subject to com-
pliance with the statutory requirements. 
When an application to appropriate lapses for failure to comply 
with any of the statutory requirements or with any order of the 
state engineer, the original priority date also lapses. If the appli-
cation is reinstated the date of priority is changed to the date of 
reinstatement.32 
2. [§ 14.32] PRESCEIPTIVB RIGHTS 
IMm to 1939 much corttosl^ existed in Utah regarding the 
relafe»#iip between adverse u#e or adverse possession and the 
doctartes of abandonment and statutory forfeiture. As previously 
noted, the exclusive method today for acquiring water rights in 
Utah is by appropriation. The Utah Code now states that "iro 
right to the use of water either appropriated or unappropriated 
can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession/03 There-
fore, any possible claims of a right arising by adverse use must 
have matured before the 1939 amendment to the Code, This re-
quires the assertion of a hostile claim of title, with the knowledge 
and acquiesence of the owner, continuously for mmm fmm be*-
fore 1939." 
"In Re Escalante Valley Drainage Area, 10 Utah 2d 77, 348 P.2d 679 (1960). 
MUTAH CODE ANN. §73-3-18 (1953); See McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 
442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948). 
*UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (1953). 
*In Re Drainage Area of Green River, 12 Utah 2d 102, 363 P.2d 199 (1961); In 
Re Drainage Area of Bear River, 12 Utah 2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961). 
ADDENDUM 3 
A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part I 
Robert W. Swenson 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND POLICY, VOLUME 5,1984 
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Robert W. Swenson* 
Author's Note: You may ask: Why another summary of Utah water 
law? It is true that there are several.1 Some were written as long as 
twenty years ago. Others, because of space limitations, were forced 
to omit areas which I believe should be covered. Yet in final analy-
sis, the real justification may be that I mmk®i i i lave my "say/' 
Law students and lawyers who have not had an opportunity to take 
a course in water law may wish to acquire some familiarity with the 
field. This article is dedicated to them—rather t h » to the "experts" 
listed in the Yellow Pages. 
In the last decade there has been a scramble in Utah to obtain 
water for the generation of electrical energy, for the protection of our 
environment, and for the consumer of the future. In the energy field 
alone, there is some indication that anticipated production of elec-
tricity will far exceed the future demands of Utah consumers.2 And 
one can scarcely pick up a newspaper which does not describe the 
bickering over the Central Utah Project.3 Perhaps, at long last, we 
will have to reappraise our system of allocating water resources.4 
Before final decisions can be made on what is the most economical 
and fair way to distribute this priceless resource,6 we must take ac-
* James I. Fair Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. 
1
 1 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LEGAL STUDIES, SUMMARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW 617-36 
(1S?8|; R, DEWSNUP & D. JENSEN, A SUMMARY DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 715-34 (1973); W. 
HMoiftlts, WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 535-70 (completed by H. Ellis & 
J.P. DeBraal Iff 1); W. HUTCHINS, THE UTAH LAW OF WATER RIGHTS (U85); 
2
 Psarras, Utah PSC Finally Coming to Grips with the State's Power Glut, Salt Lake Trib-
une, Feb. 5, 1984, at 2B, col. 1. An enormous amount of water will be required for the Inter-
mountain Power Project near Delta, Utah. A water right for an acre foot of water normally sold 
for about $200 in that area. The power project has been paying about $1750 per acre foot, and 
one farmer who had been irrigating marginal agricultural land sold his water rights for three 
million dollars. Omang, S. Utah Beginning to Feel Energy Invasion, Salt Lake Tribune, Jan. 5, 
1981, at 10B, col. 1. 
3
 The Central Utah Project is a massive federally-funded water project that will divert water 
from the Colorado River to the arid Salt Lake basin. 
4
 Some new ideas from an economist will be found in Anderson, Water Needn't Be a Fight-
ing Word, Wall St. J., Sept. 30,1983, p. 28. Mr. Anderson's forthcoming book is entitled WATER 
RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT. 
6
 Difficult decisions on rationing water are being discussed in Arizona. See Peterson, Arizona 
Aims to Cut Per Capita Water Use in Half, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1984, at A8 col. 2. 
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endorsing the stock certificate is not clear. Utah repealed the Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act that would have provided the solution to 
the problem.141 If the irrigation company is incorporated under the 
nonprofit corporation statute,142 as is usually the case, there does not 
seem to be anything in that statute which relates to transferring the 
stock. 
IV. Loss OF WATER RIGHTS 
Not long ago, a local newspaper carried the headline, "When it 
comes to water, Utahns must use or lose it."143 The story quoted the 
present state engineer as announcing that he is in the process of 
streamlining procedures for determining whether appropriators in va-
rious parts of the state are in fact using all of the water they are 
entitled to under their permits. The effort is commendable, and the 
story points up the necessity of examining the various ways in which 
appropriative rights may be lost or diminished in scope. 
A. Adverse User 
In 1937, the Utah Supreme Court held that the concept of acquir-
ing title by adverse possession should apply to appropriative water 
rights.144 Adverse possession, the court said, has been a salutary prin-
ciple of the law of property since the days of Attila the Hun,146 sug-
gesting that the policy behind the rule is to reward those who take 
possession of land by force or violence. Other explanations are more 
appropriate.146 The court should have used the term "adverse use" 
because, as the dissent pointed out, it is inconceivable that one could 
possess running water in a stream.147 The court also used the seven-
year statutory period for acquiring title to land by adverse posses-
sion148 rather than the twenty-year period which the court has always 
141
 The Uniform Stock Transfer Act's enactment is recorded at 1927 Utah Laws, ch. 55, §§1-
17, 20-23; amended at 1955 Utah Laws, ch. 24, §1; and repealed at 1965 Utah Laws ch. 154, §10-
102. 
142
 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-18 to -53 (1973). Section 16-6-42 provides that the corporation 
may issue stock "evidencing . . . interests in water or other property rights." 
148
 Salt Lake Deseret News, July 9, 1982, at A9. / 
144
 Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 P.2d 894, 900-01 (1938), reh'g deniedju Utah 35, 
75 P.2d 164 (1938). 
145
 66 P.2d at 900. 
140
 See 7 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 1012 (P. Rohan ed. 1982). 
147
 Hammond, 75 P.2d at 167 (Wolfe, J., dissenting). 
143
 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-12-5, -7, and -12 (1977). The requirement that an adverse posses-
sor pay real property taxes was not applied to water rights acquired by adverse use. Jackson v. 
Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co., 119 Utah 19, 223 P.2d 827, 833 (1950) (Wolfe, J., 
concurring). 
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applied to prescriptive easements.149 Faced with the 1903 legislate 
which provides that the permit system is the exclusive method of ad 
quiring a water right in Utah, the court confined the adverse \m 
concept to water which had been previously appropriated, i.e., it 
apply only where a junior appropriator upstream is using water ril| 
ready validly appropriated by a senior appropriator, f 
At the time of the decision, the period of the forfeiture statute115^ 
was apparently only five years. The court seemed to regard the fbrfei^l 
ture statute as suspended during the period of adverse use. That m^ 
difficult to accept. Under the wording of the forfeiture statute, th®| 
senior appropdator's right should be regarded as automatically ter-J 
minating at the end of the five-year period and reverting at that t i « t | 
to the state. The period of adverse use would then, it would seem,! 
commence to run anew against the state.151 
The court was also faced with the question whether the senior 
water user's right could be regarded as having been abandoned and 
therefore also reverting to the state. That problem was avoided by a 
finding that the senior appropriator had continuously protested the 
adverse use, so that there was no intention on his part to abandon 
the water right. Interestingly, the state moved to intervene in the 
case, apparently for the purpose of litigating its claim of ownership in 
the event of an actual abandonment. The state was assured that be-
cause it was not a party to the suit, it was in no way bound by the 
judgment. 
The ruling was overturned by statute in 1939, and since that date 
"no right to the use of pater either appropriated or unappropriated 
can be acquired by adverse use or adverse possession/'152 The su-
preme court declared that the statute waa not retroactive,153 and later 
indicated that adverse use which had commenced prior to 1939 could 
ripen into title after the effective date of the act.154 Thus, some ap-
propriative rights in Utah do have their origin in adverse use and 
149
 Pitts v. Roberts, 562 P.2d 231 (Utah 1977); Richards v. Pines Ranch, Ina, 559 P.2d 948 
(Utah 1977); Zollinger v. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P.2d 714 (1946). 
160
 For a discussion of forfeiture, see infra text accompanying notes 120 to 133. 
161
 The problem was debated in Wellsville East Field Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay Land & Live-
stock Go., 104 Utah 448, 137 P.2d 634, 638-42 (1943), reWg denied, 104 Utah 498, 143 P.2d 278 
(1943). 
162
 1939 Utah Laws, ch. I l l , §1. The section also provides: "The provisions of this section are 
applicable whether such unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to waste or is used by 
others without right." 
1M
 Mitchell v. Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co., 1 Utah 2d 313, 265 P.2d 1016, 1019 
(1954). 
164
 Wellsville East Field Irrigation, 137 P.2d at 640. 
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^accordingly may not appear of record. 
It should be noted that the 1939 statute added security and consis-
tency to the recordation and use of paper titles-165 Prescription is 
®ften difficult to prove.166 It is anomalous that while a water right 
iould be acquired before 1939 by seven-years' adverse use, twenty-
pears' adverse use was required to obtain a prescriptive easement for 
an irrigation ditch.167 
B. Abandonment and Forfeiture 
Under Utah's present statute,168 appropriative rights may be lost 
^either by abandonment or by nonuse for a, five-year period. Although 
Ihe statute is somewhat ambiguous, abandonment has always been 
Seated in Utah as a concept quite separate from statutory forfeiture 
for nonuse.169 Abandonment requires both the element of intent to 
give up ownership and nonuse (but for no specific time). Over the 
years, it is quite apparent that the Utah Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to find an abandonment for the obvious reason that appro-
priative rights are extremely valuable.160 
On the other hand, to show a forfeiture through five continuous 
years of nonuse, it is immaterial whether the appropriator intended 
to give up his water right. After the expiration of the period, the 
water right ceases to exist and the water reverts to the public. The 
term "revert" signifies an automatic termination161 (as in the case of 
a fee simple determinable) as distinguished from a forfeiture at the 
option of some other appropriator or the state engineer (as in a fee 
simple subject to a condition subsequent). The appropriator may, 
within the five-year period, file with the state engineer an application 
for an extension of time, not to exceed five years, within which to 
185
 There are difficulties, however, in holding appropriators to their paper titles. See Stone, 
Montana Water Rights—A New Opportunity, 34 MONT. L. REV. 57, 59-69 (1973). 
"• In re Use of Water Within Drainage Area of Green River, 12 Utah 2d 102, 363 P.2d 199 
(1961); In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 12 Utah 2d 1, 361 P.2d 407 (1961); 
Clark v. North Cottonwood Irrigation & Water Co., 79 Utah 425, 11 P.2d 300 (1932). 
157
 Hull v. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 162, 290 P.2d 245 (1955). These prescriptive easements may 
be lost by abandonment. Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962). 
188
 UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4 (1980). 
"• This is stated in many cases. See Torsak v. Rukavina, 67 Utah 166, 246 P. 367 (1926); Gill 
v. Malan, 29 Utah 431,82 P. 471 (1905); Promontory Ranch Co. v. Argile, 28 Utah 398, 79 P. 47 
(1904). In addition, the 1897 statute provides that "questions of abandonment shall be ques-
tions of fact, and shall be determined as are other questions of fact." 1897 Utah Laws, ch. 52, 
§2 at 219. 
160
 See$ e.g.t Dalton v. Wadley, 11 Utah 2d 84, 355 P.2d 69 (1960). 
m
 Baugh v. Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790 (1967). For a discussion of Baugh, see 
text accompanying note 163. 
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whatsoever, but any such right to appropriate any of such water 
shall be initiated by first making application to the state engineer 
for a permit to appropriate the same as provided in this chapter 
and not otherwise. 
(4) Utah. In the late 1930's, the relationships of abandonment and 
forfeiture to adverse use in connection with title to Utah water rights were in a 
state of considerable uncertainty.7*3 
In 1939, the Utah Legislature took action by so amending the water 
appropriation statute as to prevent the acquisition of a right to the use of water 
already appropriated by another, solely by adverse use. To this end, the general 
statement of the exclusive method of appropriating water by first making 
application to the State Engineer in the manner provided in the statute, and 
not otherwise, ends with the declaration, "No right to the use of water either 
appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by adverse use or adverse 
possession."784 In addition, the statutory forfeiture section includes the 
following sentence: "The provisions of this section are applicable whether such 
unused or abandoned water is permitted to run to waste or is used by others 
without right."785 
In the opinions in a number of subsequent cases, the Utah Supreme Court 
has noted that since this enactment, it is no longer possible to acquire a right to 
use of water in Utah by adverse possession and use.786 
However, after the 1939 legislation was enacted, a period of uncertainty 
ensued as to whether title by adverse possession could have been acquired 
between 1903 and 1939. Prior to 1903, when the legislature provided for an 
exclusive method of appropriating water, the Utah law was well settled that 
title could be acquired by adverse use. What, then was the situation between 
m I n a 1961 case, the Franktown Creek Irrigation Company contended that it had 
acquired a prescriptive water right before the enactment of this statute in 1949. In this 
regard, the Nevada Supreme Court said inter alia that 'To establish a n^tit by 
prescription in Franktown [Irrigation Company} before 1949 to the use of water 
claimed by the predecessor of Marlette, the use and enjoyment must have been 
uninterrupted, adverse, under a claim of right, and with the knowledge of such 
predecessor." Franktown Creek In. Co. v. Marlette Lake Co., 11 Nev. 348, 364 Pac. 
(2d) 1069, 1071(1961). 
733dark v. North Cottonwood In. d Water Co., 79 Utah 425, 437, 11 Pac. (2d) 300 
(1932); Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 28-33, 35, 39-40, 66 Pac. (2d) 894 (1937), 
75 Pac. (2d) 164 (193S); Adams v. Portage In., Res. & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 11-16, 
20, 21, 72 Pac. (2d) 648 (1937), 81 Pac. (2d) 368 (1938). 
7M
 Utah Laws 1939, ch. 111, Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1968). 
n5Id. § 73-1-4. 
™Smith v. Sanders, 112 Utah 517, 520-521, 189 Pac. (2d) 701 (1948); Jackson v. 
Spanish Fork West Field In. Co., 119 Utah 19, 31, 223 Pac. (2d) 827 (1950);Mitchell 
v. Spanish Fork West Field In. Co., 1 Utah (2d) 313, 317, 265 Pac. (2d) 1016 (1954); 
In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 12 Utah (2d) 1, 5-6, 361 Pac. (2d) 
407 (1961); In re Use of Water Within Drainage Area of Green River, 12 Utah (2d) 102, 
105-106, 363 Pac. (2d) 199 (1961). 
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1903 and 1939? The uncertainty, according to the Utah Supreme Court in the 
1943 Wellsville case, resulted from litigation in the 1937-1938 Hammond and 
Adams cases787 and the 1903 and subsequent 1939 legislation.788 So, to settle 
the question, the Utah court in the Wellsville case reverted to the Hammond 
case, in which it was held that the forfeiture statutes prior to 1939 did not 
apply to a situation in which failure to use water was the result of an unlawful 
diversion by another, and that title could therefore be acquired by adverse 
use.789 "We think that this attains a desirable result and conclude that title 
could between 1903 and 1939 be acquired by adverse possession. Implicit in 
this holding is the holding that adverse use will not work a statutory 
forfeiture." [Emphasis added.] 79° 
(5) Washington. The Washington statutes provide that "No rights to the use 
of surface or ground waters of the state affecting either appropriated or 
unappropriated waters thereof may be acquired by prescription or adverse 
use."791 
Questionings.-{I) New Mexico. In 1937, the New Mexico Supreme Court, 
in referring to the testimony introduced in the trial in the lower court, said 
that the testimony did not prove an abandonment of the water right in 
question, "nor a prescriptive right (if such a right can be acquired under our 
law) * * * r192 
111
 Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 66 Pac. (2d) 894 (1937), 75 Pac. (2d) 164 (1938); 
Adams v. Portage In, Res. & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 Pac. (2d) 648 (1937), 81 Pac. 
(2d) 368 (1938). 
n
* Wellsville East Field In. Co. v. Lindsay Land & Livestock Co., 104 Utah 448,456^57, 
462, 137 Pac. (2d) 634 (1943). 
7S9In Hammond v. Johnson, 94 Utah 20, 33, 66 Pac. (2d) 984 (1937), 75 Pac. (2d) 164 
(1938), the court had said inter alia: "It will thus be seen, both from the provisions of 
the statute and from the inherent nature of the terms and situations from which they 
arise that adverse possession is not founded upon or dependent on the doctrines of 
abandonment, or forfeiture for nonuser, of water rights. The state is interost&d in the 
matter of abandonment of water rights and nonuser thereof, because of the importance 
of water due to the arid conditions of the state. Abandonment and nonuser of water 
rights presupposes that such waters are thereby permitted to run to waste, to prevent 
which the state steps in and permits othorst who wiJl put the water to beneficial use, 
to do so. As long as water which has passed to private hands is put to a beneficial use, 
the state has no vital interest as to who the user is. That is, as long as the use granted 
and recognized by the state is exercised, the state has no interest in what may be the 
name of the person who exercises i t It follows, therefore, that notwithstanding the 
statute of appropriation, as between private^claimants, water rights in Utah can be 
acquired by adverse user and possession." 
790With respect to the distinction between prescription and statutory forfeiture, see also 
the discussion of In re Drainage Area of Bear River in Rich County, 12 Utah (2d) 1, 
4-5, 361 Pac. (2d) 407 (1961), under "Prescription Distinguished from Other Methods 
of Loss," supra. 
mWash. Rev. Code § 90.14.220 (Supp. 1970), 
™Pioneer Irrigating Ditch Co. v. Blashek, 41 N. Mex. 99, 102, 64 Pac. (2d) 388 (1937). 
In Bounds v. Canter, 53 N. Mex. 234, 205 Pac. (2d) 216, 223 (1949), in response to 
the defendants, claim of a prescriptive right based on 10-yearV use, the court said: 
